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For many observers, the capacity of African countries to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI) is principally determined by their natural resources and the size of their
local markets.  Over the years, Nigeria and Angola have been two of the most successful
countries because of their comparative location advantage in oil despite their unstable
political and economic environments.
The apparent lack of interest of transnational corporations (TNCs) in African
countries that have attempted to implement policy reforms has also contributed to support
this argument.  The balkanization of African countries is frequently used as an argument
that this continent has been much less favoured than Asia and Latin America over the
past decade.  It has been argued that the reforms in many African countries have been
incomplete and thus have not fully convinced foreign investors to develop activities that
are not dependent on natural resources and aimed at regional and global markets.  True, it
takes time for a country to modify its image, especially when the State has a long
tradition of policy intervention, and when the reforms have been mostly symbolic with
the adoption of new texts that have not yet been translated into actions.
This note will identify which African countries have been able to attract FDI by
improving their business climate. These countries show that pro-active policies and
reform-oriented Governments can generate FDI interest.  This conclusion does not differ
from the one reached for countries such as Singapore or Ireland.  It simply makes the
point that African countries can also be successful in attracting FDI that is not based on
natural resources or aimed at the local market, but rather at regional and global markets,
by implementing policy reforms. An econometric analysis of 29 African countries and a
detailed review of two successful ones - Mali and Mozambique - will illustrate which
policy factors have played a significant role in the improvement of their business climate
- at least in the views of foreign investors.
2Why? Determinants of FDI in Africa
Although there has been a considerable number of analytical and empirical
studies on FDI inflows,' there has been a limited consensus on which factors play an
unambiguous role in explaining the location decision of TNCs.  It is generally accepted
that market size and access to natural resources are crucial determinants in their decision
processes.
Not surprisingly, the African countries that have been able to attract most FDI
have been those with the largest tangible assets such as natural and mineral resources as
well as large domestic markets. About 65 per cent of total FDI inflows to Africa
concentrated in South Africa, Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire in 1996/1997, which also
accounted for about two-third of the sub-continent's GDP during the same period (table
1). The role of market size can be further evidenced by the almost perfect positive
correlation between FDI inflows and GDP for a group of 29 African countries during
1996 and 1997 (the correlation coefficient equals 0.99)2.
The role of natural resources in the location decision of TNCs is apparent through
the sectoral allocation of FDI inflows within the region. Traditionally, about 60 per cent
of FDI in Africa is allocated to oil and natural resources (UNCTAD, 1999). This is
corroborated by the coefficient correlation between FDI inflows and the total value of
natural resources in each country, 3 which appears close to unity (i.e. 0.94) for the group
of 29 African countries during 1996-1997. The Africa region possesses not only large
reserves of oil, gold, diamonds and copper but also more than half of the world's  cobalt
and manganese, one third of bauxite and more than 80 per cent of chromium and
platinum.  The sub-continent is also among the main exporters of agricultural products
such as cocoa, coffee and sugar.
See for example, Wheeler and Mody (1992); Singh and Jun (1995); UNCTAD (1998).
2 The link between FDI inflows and size could be further explored, as, for example, one may argue
that there may exist a non-linear relationship between these two variables. This goes, however, beyond the
scope of this note.
3 The total value of natural resources in each country is estimated as the sum of the primary and
the secondary sectors, minus manufacturing.  Source: World Bank's  World Development  Report  (1999).
3The strong reliance of African countries on their natural resources and market size
has been well evidenced by many studies. 4 It might be more pertinent to look at which
countries have been most successful in attracting FDI over the past few years, when they
could not rely on the natural resources and the size of their domestic market.  To do so,
we propose to normalize the value of total FDI inflows by GDP and the total value of
natural resources in each country. For simplicity, we label this indicator as the business
climate for FDI (FDIBC):
FDIBCj= FDIJ /(GDPj * NRj)a  (1)
where FDI is defined as the FDI inflows in country i, GDP as the gross domestic product
and NR the value of natural resources (all of them expressed in dollars). Equation (1)
assumes that the elasticities of FDI inflows to changes in GDP and natural resources are
both equal to unity (a = 1), which seem consistent with the estimated elasticities that will
be reported later in the paper for the group of African countries surveyed in this note. 5
4 See for example,  Pigato  (2000)  for a review.
5 The assumption  that  both elasticities  equal  unity  is valid  for the group  of African  countries
covered  in  this note. However,  if the sample  is widened  to include  industrial  countries  for example,  this
assumption  does not hold  because  of the large  differences  in GDP level  between  countries  (for  example,
United  States  and Burundi).
4Table 1.  FDI inflows and GDP: ranking of 29 African countries, average 1996-1997
(Millions of dollars)
Net FDI Inflows  GDP
South Africa  2313.5  129094
Nigeria  1566.0  36540
Cote d'Ivoire  305.1  10251
Angola  265.5  7396
Tanzania  154.0  6707
Uganda  148.0  6555
Namibia  109.9  3453
Ghana  101.3  6762
Senegal  92.2  4542
Mozambique  68.3  1944
Zimbabwe  66.5  8512
Zambia  64.0  4051
Mali  61.6  2532
Mauritius  46.7  4151
Cameroon  40.0  9115
Benin  31.5  2137
Guinea  20.6  3998
Chad  16.5  1603
Kenya  16.2  9899
Madagascar  12.1  3552
Congo, Republic  8.5  2298
Central African Republic  5.5  954
Ethiopia  5.0  6330
Rwanda  2.4  1771
Congo, Democratic Rep. Of.  1.5  6904
Malawi  1.5  2424
Burundi  1.0  1137
Niger  1.0  1858
Sierra Leone  1.0  940
Source: World Development Report, World Bank (1999).
Our indicator captures the attraction of African countries for FDI when they can
rely on everything except for their natural resources and market size. Therefore, it
reflects not only policy and political variables but also a series of structural factors such
as infrastructure, transport costs and human capital.  By indicating the attraction of the
FDI business climate for each country, it complements the data collected in investors'
surveys and cross-country ranking such as The Africa  Competitiveness  Report  published
by the World Economic Forum.  One has to keep in mind, however, that our indicator
reflects existing rather than potential data/information and, thus, might be a poor
predicator of future FDI flows.
5Table 2. Business Climate for FDI:  ranking of 29 African countries,
average 1995-1997
Country  FDI/business  climate  a  ICRG  political  riskb  Institutional  Investor
Namibia  1  1  NA
Mali  2  12  13
Mozambique  3  11  18
Zambia  4  4  14
Chad  5  NA  NA
Senegal  6  13  6
Angola  7  18  20
Benin  8  NA  12
Mauritius  9  NA  I
Cote d'Ivoire  10  8  8
Tanzania  11  5  10
Uganda  12  15  11
Central African Republic  13  NA  NA
Ghana  14  7  4
Madagascar  15  9  NA
Burundi  16  NA  NA
Rwanda  17  NA  NA
Zimbabwe  18  4  3
Congo, Rep.  19  14  19
Nigeria  20  17  15
Niger  21  20  NA
Guinea  22  19  17
Malawi  23  6  7
Cameroon  24  16  9
Kenya  25  5  5
South Africa  26  2  2
Ethiopia  27  10  15
Sierra Leone  28  21  22
Congo, Dem. Rep.  29  22  21
Sources:  Author's own calculations; Pigato (1999).
a  The business climate index is defined as net FDI inflows normalized by GDP and the total value of
natural resources in each host country.
b  Political risk rating based on the opinion of banks, TNCs and other institutional investors indicating
corruption, political and judicial institutions.
c Institutional Investor rating measures a country's creditworthiness, which is mostly determined by
economic and financial variables.
The ranking of 29 African countries according to the indicator proposed above is
presented in table 2 (first column). In 1995-1997, the most attractive country was
Namibia, followed by Mali, Mozambique, Zambia, Chad and Senegal. 6 The least
attractive were Congo, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Preliminary findings for 1998 indicate
6 The good  ranking  of Chad  and Zambia  reflects  that the first country  offers  great  oil reserves  (not
reflected in our indicator of natural resources) that have attracted companies interested to explore those
6that there have not been many changes in the ranking, with Mozambique and Namibia
still on the top of the list.7 A rapid comparison across regions reveals that Singapore had
a FDI business indicator index twice as high as the best African country in 1995/1997.
However, Ireland and Hungary were ranked about the same level as Senegal and
Mauritius.  This result may appear surprising at first sight, but one can observe that the
flows of FDI were about the same in Senegal and Ireland, when compare to their
respective GDP in 1997 (about 3.8 per cent) and Ireland has, in dollars, more natural
resources than Senegal.  It may also reveal some of the limits of our indicator when the
differences in GDP are too big across countries - the assumption that FDI is perfectly
elastic to changes in GDP might not be robust across region or countries with large
differences in GDP levels.
Our ranking can be compared with those obtained in some well known surveys
such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and the Institutional Investors (II)
ratings that are reported in the second and third columns of table 2.8 If the ranking
appears quite similar for a few countries, 9 there exist significant differences both at the
top and bottom of the table.  While South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Malawi appear
in the bottom half of our ranking, they are on the top of the list for the two other
indicators.  On the other hand, Mali and Mozambique have not been ranked very high by
the ICRG and II indexes but are among the most attractive countries according to our
indicator.  Io
possibilities;  Zambia  has followed  a relatively  aggressive  privatization  programme  and liberalization
policy.
7 The 1998  ranking  is incomplete  because  the data on FDI  inflows  are still  missing  for a few
countries.
8 Unfortunately,  the Competitiveness  Indicator  developed  by the World  Economic  Forum  is not
available  for most of the countries  covered  in this  note. However,  Namibia  and Mauritius  were also  well
ranked  in their 1998  ranking,  but South  Africa  was perceived  as much  more  competitive,  while
Mozambique  much less  than reported  in  this note.
9 For example,  Namibia  has been  traditionally  perceived  as a secure  country,  with satisfactory
macroeconomic  indicators,  a good and  reliable  judiciary  system  and  access  to the large South  African
market. Similarly,  the weak performance  of Sierra  Leone  and Congo  has been  well  publicized  with  their
unstable  political  climate  and multiple  economic  problems.
10  In fact, the coefficient  correlation  between  our indicator  and  the ICRG  and II indexes  is negative
for the period 1996-1997 (see more details in the next section).
7In our opinion, these differences can be explained the by more global concept
captured by our indicator, which aims at reflecting the FDI that cannot be explained by
the size of the local market and the availability of natural resources.  As mentioned
earlier, it reflects not only the policy and political environment in a host country but also
a series of factors such as the geographical location, infrastructure and the stock of
human capital. The ICRG and II indexes capture only two of these multiple elements:
the political and financial risks in each country. Another major difference is that these
indexes are built with investors' surveys, mainly intemational banks, and thus are more
subjective and forward-looking than our indicator that is constructed by using actual FDI
flows and economic data.  These differences can be illustrated by the cases of Zimbabwe
and South Africa.  Although Zimbabwe appears to be a country with low political (fourth
out of 24 countries) and financial (third) risks, the fact of the matter is that most foreign
investors have been reluctant to invest there.  Their prudence may be explained by the
weak growth performance over the past few years and numerous barriers against FDI,
especially when Zimbabwe is compared to market-oriented neighbours such as Zambia,
Uganda and Mozambique.  Those obstacles are not captured by the ICRG or II index.
The South African economy has benefited from large inflows of FDI in the recent years,
but they have been mainly due to the privatization process, the return of companies based
in neighbouring countries during the apartheid period and the interest of investors in the
large domestic market (about three times greater than the second largest African country,
i.e. Nigeria).  Those factors are not related directly to the business climate, which remains
quite problematic.  The trade liberalization process remains timid with the exclusion of
some important industries and relatively long transition periods.  The economic growth
performance in recent years has proved to be too modest to convince foreign investors,
which is reflected in our indicator but not clearly in the ICRG or II index.
It might be useful to examine the variations in the business climate, as a source of
attraction for FDI, for the group of 29 African countries over the past decade (table 3).
At the end of the 1  980s, the most attractive countries were Zambia, Mauritius, Chad and
Benin. Then, in the early 1  990s, Benin, Namibia, Chad, Zambia and Mozambique were
ranked as the most performing countries.  In the last few years, Namibia, Mali and
8Mozambique appeared on the top of the list.  Overall, we found that the ranking has been
relatively stable over time with about the same strong and weak performers, suggesting
that it takes time to establish a good or bad reputation.
Table 3. Comparison  over time  of the business  climate  for FDI  in Africa
Rank  Average 1986-1990  Average 1991-1994  Average 1995-1997
I  Zambia  Benin  Namibia
2  Mauritius  Namibia  Mali
3  Chad  Chad  Mozamnbique
4  Benin  Zambia  Zambia
5  Rwanda  Mozambique  Chad
6  Niger  Angola  Senegal
7  Congo, Rep.  Mauritius  Angola
8  Central African  Senegal  Benin
Republic
9  Guinea  Ghana  Mauritius
10  Namibia  Uganda  Cote d'Ivoire
11  Madagascar  Madagascar  Tanzania
12  Angola  Nigeria  Uganda
13  Mozambique  Guinea  Central African Republic
14  Senegal  Rwanda  Ghana
15  Nigeria  Tanzania  Madagascar
16  Cote d'Ivoire  Congo, Rep.  Burundi
17  Kenya  Mali  Rwanda
18  Burundi  Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe
19  Ghana  Malawi  Congo, Rep.
20  Ethiopia  Burundi  Nigeria
21  Malawi  Kenya  Niger
22  Uganda  Cote d'Ivoire  Guinea
23  South Africa  Ethiopia  Malawi
24  Mali  South Africa  Cameroon
25  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Kenya
26  Cameroon  Cameroon  South Africa
27  Zimbabwe  Niger  Ethiopia
28  Sierra Leone  Central African Republic  Sierra Leone
29  Tanzania (N/A)  Sierra Leone  Congo, Dem. Rep.
A few countries have shown significant changes in their business climate over the
past decade.  Foreign investors have recognized the progress achieved by countries such
as Mali (from 26 in 1986-1990 to 5 in 1995-1997), Uganda (from 24 to 13) and
Mozambique (from 13 to 3) where FDI inflows jumped about 600 per cent, 100 per cent
9and 90 per cent, respectively, between 1993-1994 and 1995-1997. On the other hand,
several countries have seen a severe deterioration of their investment environment:
Rwanda (from 6 to 18), Niger (from 7 to 22), and Congo Republic (from 8 to 20). Those
countries went through unstable political events during these years, with a strong and
negative impact on foreign investment.
What makes a business climate attractive in Africa?
At first sight, there are no apparent patterns that emerge from the ranking
presented in the previous section.  It could have been a priori argued that the small, non-
oil exporting and landlocked countries would have made the strongest effort to improve
their business climate to attract foreign investors. There are two - complementary -
approaches that can be followed to attempt to define what the successful countries have
been doing right.  First, an econometric analysis can help to identify the main factors.
Second a description of the policy reforms implemented in a few successful countries
may be practical.  These two approaches are presented below.
The absence of reliable statistical data on most African countries precludes a
rigorous econometric analysis. However, as a starting point, we proceeded with panel
data and cross-country analyses of the 29 countries presented earlier in which we tested a
number of explanatory variables.  The selection of these variables was done on the basis
of the existing literature and the following equation was chosen:
FDIBCit = ao + algit + a2 IRit  + a3Tit + a4TM;t + a5UPit  (2)
with:
FDIBCit = business climate for FDI in country i at tirre t
g = GDP growth
IR = illiteracy rate (per cent of people aged 15 and above)
T = trade/GDP
TM = telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)
10UP = ratio of urban to total population
Contrary to most econometric studies, we do not try to explain FDI inflows but
rather the FDI that does not arise from market size and the natural resources available in
the host country.  Therefore, the dependent variable used in the regression is our business
climate indicator as defined by equation (1). As discussed earlier, we assume that FDI
inflows respond to a change in GDP or natural resources with perfect elasticity.  To check
the robustness of this assumption, we have also estimated the same equation but with FDI
inflows as a dependent variable and GDP and natural resources as explanatory variables.
We found the respective elasticities of 0.91 and 0.92 and 1.4 and 1.2 in our panel and
cross-country regressions (see table 4, third column)." 
A brief explanation might be necessary for our selection of explanatory variables,
which has been partly driven by the availability of data in the World Bank's database. 12
The economic growth rate should influence positively the business climate for FDI as it
reflects an improvement in economic performance. Most recent studies have also
evidenced that the degree of openness, as measured by the trade share in GDP, should
influence positively foreign investors through trade liberalization and higher
competitiveness.  The illiteracy rate should be inversely related to the availability of
relatively skilled labour - a major factor in the location decision of TNCs. The number
of telephone lines per 1,000 people is viewed as an indicator of infrastructure and
communication development. Finally, the recent literature has argued that investors can
be lured by concentration of other companies or customers, since it reduces their
transport costs and there are evident economies of scale in the development of backward
and forward linkages.  This argument might be partially captured by the share of urban
population (as a percentage of total population). Note we will also test the relationship
'Wheeler  and Mody (1992) found that market size had a positive influence on capital
expenditures by manufacturing affiliates of United States TNCs between 1982 and 1988,  with an elasticity
of 1.57. Elasticity for the highest income countries was 1.86, while that for the lowest-income countries
was 0.74.
12 For a good review of determinants of FDI in the African context, see Srinivasan (1999). Note
that we tested additional explanatory variables to those reported in the text such as income per capita and a
dummy variable for landlocked countries. However, those do not appear to influence significantly the
business climate index.
11between our indicator of business climate and the political and financial risks indicators
reported in the preceding section.
Table 4. Econometric results:  sensitivity of business climate to policy variables
(T-statistics in parenthesis)
Panel data a  Cross Country
Dependant variable  FDI business  FDI inflows  FDI business  FDI inflows
climate  climate
Economic growth  0.123  0.101  0.587
(1.90)  (1.71)  (1.96)
Trade openness  0.163  2.812  0.172  1.812
(2.43)  (3.23)  (1.94)  (1.50)
Illiteracy rate  -0.209  1.097  0.139  0.489
(-0.39)  (1.09)  (1.33)  (0.80)
Telephone lines  -0.0404  -0.407  0.0129  -0.144
(-0.51)  (-0.42)  (0.15)  (-0.46)
Urban population  -0.978  -0.228  -0.0937  -0.525
(-1.21)  (-1.26)  (-0.49)  (-0.63)
GDP  0.91  1.415
(3.97)  (4.28)
Natural resources  0.92  1.214
(7.04)  (3.89)
Adj  FR  0.08  0.433  0.04  0.56
Number of observations  236  236  29  29
a  Fixed-term effects were used for our panel data regressions.
We estimated equation (2) for the panel data of 29 countries over the period 1990-
1997. Alternatively, we proceeded with cross-country regressions using the average
values of the selected variable during the same period.  The panel data regression
includes fixed-term effects because the results from testing the homogeneity of such
effects indicate that the changes in the FDI business climate include critical time-
correlated elements common to all countries.
The estimated results of our panel regression indicate that GDP growth rate and
trade openness have been positively and significantly correlated with the investment
climate in Africa (table 4).13 The positive impact of trade openness seems to confirm the
arguments that trade liberalization leads to a more general reduction in administrative
12barriers and improve the business environment in the host economy - countries with low
trade barriers also tend to have low barriers to FDI - as well as conveys the right signal to
the international business community (Lall, 2000). In a more specific context, free trade
zones have been much successful in attracting FDI with stable, growing economic
environment and trade liberalization (Madani, 1999). In contrast, the illiteracy rate, the
number of telephone lines and the share of urban population do not appear to have been
major determinants in the business climate for FDI in the region. Those results
corroborate those obtained in the cross-country regression. Note that we also tested the
impact of political and financial risks (as measured by ICRG and II), but these did not
appear significant in the business climate in our (cross-country) regressions. These
findings are not surprising in view of the significant differences in the rankings presented
in table 2, but contradict somewhat the results obtained in other studies.  For example,
Zdenek Drabek and Warren Payne (1999) found a highly positive correlation between the
ICRG index and FDI for a sample of countries, including both industrial and developing
countries.  The inclusion of only four African countries in their sample may explain the
difference between their and our estimated results.'4
The above results are indicative but should be interpreted with caution because of
several statistical and econometric problems. There are numerous data shortcomings in
most African countries. 15 For example, it would be interesting to separate how much of
the FDI inflows were the result of privatization receipts; but the data were not consistent
and available for the surveyed countries over a sufficient period of time.  Also, the
variables used in the regressions may capture imperfectly the relationship with the
business climate; for example the number of telephone lines does not always reflect the
quality and costs of the telecommunication infrastructure in each country. The same
problems can be associated with the illiteracy rate and the urban population.  The
estimated effects of the GDP growth and trade openness might be biased because of
13 Our  findings  are  consistent  with  the  results  obtained  by  Elbadawi  and  Mwega  (1997)  in a recent
regression analysis of FD1 in Africa.
14 A closer look at the data indicates that the variations in the ICRG index are not large across
African countries, which are all at the bottom of the ranking. The influence of the political climate as
investors' decision may only occur when there are significant differences across countries, which is the
case in the Drabek-Payne sample as it includes countries such as Denmark and Sierra Leone.
13causality problems since changes in the business climate may determine and be
determined by the GDP growth rate. Foreign companies may simultaneously follow or
push the trade liberalization effort in a country.
To circumvent these statistical and analytical shortcomings, one could use more
sophisticated econometric techniques or alternative indicators. Instead, we propose to
examine more closely the experience of two individual economies - Mali and
Mozambique - that have shown major improvements in their business climate during the
1990s, as reported in table 3.16 If, in terms of FDI growth, the performance of Mali
appears less impressive, it has to be taken into account that the its geographical position
(landlocked and not close to the South African market) is not as favourable as that of
Mozambique.
What have Mali and Mozambique been doing right? This can be hard to
summarize because establishing an attractive business climate for FDI is a multi-
dimensional effort. Yet, a few major actions can be identified (see table 5 for details and
chronology). First, it appears that these two countries have established a stable
macroeconomic environment, at least by regional standards, for a prolonged period of
time.  The political climate also became secure after a period of high instability. Both
countries used aggressive trade liberalization and privatization programmes (especially
Mozambique) to attract foreign investors.  The Govermnents approved important pieces
of legislation, including new Mining (1991) and Investment (1995) Codes in Mali17  and a
new Industrial Free Zone regime in Mozambique (1994). Moreover, the adoption of
international treaties related to FDI helped to increase the Governments' visibility in the
international business community as well as provided additional insurance to potential
foreign investors.  Last but not least, the Presidents have played an important role in
promoting their countries abroad, both in the case of Mali and Mozambique.
15 As indicated  in the previous  footnote,  we tested  additional  variables.
16 It has  to be noted  that  preliminary  indications  shows  that if Mozambique  remained  the economy
with  the most attractive  business  climate  in 1998,  Mali  declined  to seventh  place in 1998  from  fourth  in
1996/1997.
14Another interesting element is that FDI inflows were triggered by the
implementation of a few large projects such as the MOZAL project in Mozambique.
True, those projects were initially triggered by the presence of natural resources, but they
have contributed to put firms these two countries on the radar screen of international
investors. The same argument obviously applies to privatization.' 8 As an illustration of
this multiplier effect, it suffices to look at the investment projects financed by the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) - the private arm of the World Bank Group - in
Mozambique and Mali over the past few years. Those investments range from projects in
banking to printing and tourism, for a total commitment of $65 million and $134 million
in Mali and Mozambique, respectively, as of June 1998. Interestingly, the IFC's
portfolio in Mozambique was the largest in Africa, while that in Mali ranked in sixth
position, greater than that in Nigeria, Cameroon or Ghana.  We believe that the IFC's
portfolio allocation illustrates well the interest of the international private community in
these two countries and the progress that they have achieved in their business climate.  19
1  See also UNCTAD and ICC (forthcoming).
1s  One of the positive externalities of the MOZAL project in Mozambique has been its impact on
the Government's commitment to reduce administrative barriers.  For fuller details, see Wells (2000).
9 It would be worth exploring further if the IFC investments  have been perceived as signals by
other private investors that the business climate has been improving in the host country.
15Table 5. Major  actions in Mali and Mozambique
Area  Mali  Mozainbique
*  Macroeconomic stability  The macroeconomic indicators  The economic growth rate
improved dramatically, as real  jumped from 4.0 per cent in 1990
GDP growth reached  to 13.3  per cent in 1997.
approximately 7 per cent in 1997,  Inflation was reduced from 70 per
up from 0.6 per cent in 1990.  cent in 1994 to single digits by
Average annual inflation, as  1997.
measured by the consumer price
index for Bamako, was reduced
from 12.4  per cent in 1995, to 4
per cent in 1998. Both the
external account deficit and fiscal
deficit were reduced, and a
prudent credit policy was
pursued.
*  Trade liberalization  The trade openness ratio  The trade openness ratio
increased from 49 per cent in  increased from 53 per cent in
1990 to 60 per cent in 1997,  with  1990 to 63 per cent in 1997. In
a reduction in tariffs and the  1996,  the Government
elimination of several non-tariff  rationalized and lowered the tariff
barriers.  structure, averaging around 14
per cent
*  Privatization  After a slow start, privatization  Mozambique's privatization
receipts reached $22 million in  programme is one of the most
1997, including the sale of  active in Africa as well: more
several enterprises in the financial  than 900 state enterprises have
and manufacturing sectors.  been privatized, including the
entire banking sector and a
number of state manufacturing
firns.  The privatization receipts
reached  $37 millions in 1997.
*  Focus on one/ few major  Investment projects in the mining  The development of the new $1.3
projects  sector (gold) were realized by  billion MOZAL aluminum
Rand Gold and Ashanti,  smelter facility.
facilitated by the reform of the
Mining Code in 1991.
*  Political stability  In March 1991, a series of clashes  The General Peace Agreement in
between the people and the army  1992 between FRELIMO and
culminated in the arrest of the  RENAMO and the general
President.  In January 1992,  the  elections that followed in 1994
Alliance pour la democratie au  were important steps towards
Mali (ADEMA), leading a  national reconciliation and
coalition of opposition parties,  stability. FRELIMO won the first
established electoral dominance,  national election. The opposition,
while its candidate was elected  RENAMO, retains almost 45 per
President. He was recently  cent of the seats in parliament.
reelected in May 1997 for another
five-year term.
*  Implementation of new laws  . Mining Code (1991)  . Industrial Free Zone (1994)
and accession to international  *  Investment Code (1995)  . Multilateral Investment
agreements related to FDI  *  Multilateral Investment  Guarantee Agency (1994)
16Guarantee  Agency  (1992)  *  World  Intellectual  Property
*  Convention  on the  Organization  (1996)
Recognition  and  . Convention  on the
Enforcement  of Foreign  Settlement  of Investnent
Arbitral  Awards  (1994)  Disputes  between  States  and
___________________________  _______________Nationals  and States (1995)
It is also revealing to compare Mali and Mozambique with countries such as
Kenya and Cameroon, which have been much less successful in attracting FDI in spite of
larger local markets and abundant natural resources (table 1). The business indicator for
these two last countries shows that they have not been attractive, twenty-fifth and twenty-
fourth, respectively in 1996/1997. Indeed, these countries have not been able to focus on
any of the actions that have been identified as key elements of the recent success of Mali
and Mozambique.  Their macroeconomic performance has been below the regional
average, their privatization and trade liberalization efforts rather timid, there has been no
major foreign investment projects, and only a few legislative changes have been
implemented in recent years.  Last but not least, these two countries have established a
reputation of high corruption and lack of transparency.
A final word of caution might be necessary.  Both countries, Mali and
Mozambique, have been through a spectacular recovery during the 1  990s, after several
years of internal disrupt and (dis) investments by foreign companies.  The large FDI
inflows observed in the past few years might therefore benefit from a catch-up effect in
which it was relatively easy to attract investment projects during the initial recovery but
that maintaining such a pace would be increasingly more difficult over time.  Only a
sustained effort in improving the business climate will continue to attract (foreign)
investors.  And, in both countries, there is still much room for improvement in areas such
as infrastructure, transport costs and human capital.
17Conclusions
Countries that can offer a large domestic market and/or natural resources have
inevitably attracted foreign investors in Africa. South Africa, Nigeria, Ivory Cost, and
Angola have been traditionally the main recipients of FDI within the region.
Over the past decade, several African countries have attempted to improve their
business climate in an effort to attract foreign companies. Establishing a competitive
business climate is a difficult task because it takes time - not only to implement policies
but also to convince potential investors. In the case of Africa, it is even more difficult
because most countries are not even on the radar screen of most companies. In 1997, we
found that Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal and Mali were perceived as the countries with
the most attractive investment environments. Those countries were also able to attract
substantial FDI inflows, more than countries that have bigger local market (Kenya,
Cameroon, Congo) andlor natural resources (Congo, Zimbabwe).
To improve the climate for FDI, an econometric analysis indicates that strong
economic growth and aggressive trade liberalization can be used to fuel the interest of
foreign investors.  Similarly, a closer look at the experience of Mali and Mozambique -
two countries that have shown a spectacular improvement in their business climate during
the 1990s - reveals that the implementation of a few visible actions is essential in the
strategy of attracting FDI.  Beyond macroeconomic and political stability, those countries
focused on a few strategic actions such as:
opening the economy through a trade liberalization reform;
launching an attractive privatization programme;
*  modernizing mining and investment codes;
*  adopting international agreements related to FDI;
*  developing a few priority projects that have a multiplier effects on other
investment projects; and
18mounting an image building effort with the participation of high political figures,
including the President.
Interestingly, these actions do not differ significantly from those that have been identified
behind the success of other small countries with limited natural resources such as Ireland
and Singapore about twenty years ago.
References
Drabek, Zdenek and Warren Payne (1999).  "The impact of transparency on foreign
direct investment", Staff Working Paper, EAR 99-02 (Geneva:  World Trade
Organization).
Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Mwega Francis M. (1997).  "FDI in Africa" (Washington D.C.:
World Bank), mimeo.
Lall, Sanjaya (2000).  "FDI and development:  research issues in the emerging context",
(Oxford:  Oxford University), mimeo.
Madani, Dorsati (1999).  "A review of the role and impact of export processing zones",
Policy Working Paper, No. 2238 (Washington D.C.:  World Bank).
Pigato, Miria (1999).  "Foreign direct investment in Africa: old tales and new evidence"
(Washington D.C.:  World Bank), mimeo.
Singh, Harinder and Kwang Jun (1995). "Some new evidence on determinants of foreign
direct investment in developing countries", Policy Research Working Paper, No.
1531 (Washington D.C.:  World Bank).
19Srinivasan, Krishna (1999). "Foreign direct investment in Africa:  some case studies"
(Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund), mimeo.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1998).  World
Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants (New York and Geneva:
United Nations), United Nations publication, Sales No. E.98.II.D.5.
(1999).  Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential
(New York and Geneva: United Nations), United Nations publication,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc.  15.
and International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (forthcoming).  Guide d'
Investment du Mali (New York and Geneva: United Nations; Paris:  ICC).
Wells, Louis T. (2000). "Cutting red tape:  lessons from a case-based approach to
improving the investment climate in Mozambique" in Administrative Barriers to
Foreign Investment by Jarnes Emery, Melvin Spence, Louis Wells and Timothy
Buehrer, FIAS Occasional Paper N. 14, Washington, DC., 2000.
Wheeler, David and A. Mody (1992). "International investment location decisions: the
case of U.S. firms", Journal of International Economics, 33, pp. 57-76.
World Bank (1999).  World Development Report (Washington D.C.:  World Bank).
World Economic Forum (1998).  The Africa Competitiveness Report, World Economic
Forum, Geneva, Switzerland
20Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2468  Pricing,  Subsidies,  and  the Poor:  Ian Walker  November  2000  S. Delgado
Demand  for Improved  Water  Services Fidel  Ordohez  37840
in Central  America  Pedro  Serrano
Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2469  Risk  Shifting  and Long-Term  Mansoor  Dailami  November  2000  W. Nedrow
Contracts:  Evidence  from the  Robert  Hauswald  31585
Ras  Gas Project
WPS2470  Are Larger  Countries  Really  More  Stephen  Knack  November  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Corrupt?  Omar  Azfar  38526
WPS2471  Validating  Cperational  Food  Luc J. Christiaensen  November  2000  L. Christiaensen
Insecurity  Indicators  against  a  Richard  N. Boisvert  81463
Dynamic  Benchmark:  Evidence  John Hoddinott
from  Mali
WPS2472 Uzbekistan  and Kazakkhstan:  Asad  Alam  November  2000  L. Henson
A Tale  of Two  Transition  Paths  Arup  Banerji  84026
WPS2473  Banking  Risks  around  the World:  Luc Laeven  November  2000  R. Vo
The Implicit  Safety  Net  Subsidy  33722
Approach
WPS2474 Exports  and Information  Spillovers  Alessandro  Nicita  November  2000  L. Tabada
Marcelo  Olarreaga  36896
WPS2475 Industrial  Growth  and the Quality  of  David  A. Grigorian  November  2000  A. Nelson
Institutions:  What  Do (Transition)  Albert Martinez  37117
Economies  Have  to Gain  from  the
Rule  of Law?
WPS2476  Measuring  Banking  Efficiency  in the  Cevdet  Denizer  November  2000  M. Ding
Pre- and Post-Liberalization  Mustafa  Ding  36233
Environment:  Evidence  from the  Murat  Tarimcilar
Turkish  Banking  System
WPS2477  Picking  the Poor:  Indicators  for  Norbert  R. Schady  November  2000  T. Gomez
Geographic  Targeting  in Peru  32127
WPS2478  Institutions,  Politics,  and Contracts:  Lorena  Alcazar  November  2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
The  Attempt  to Privatize  the Water  Lixin  Colin  Xu  37644
and Sanitation  Utility  of Lima,  Peru  Ana Maria  Zuluaga
WPS2479  Estimating  the Effects  of Corruption: Aminur  Rahman  November  2000  S. Powell
Implications  for Bangladesh  Gregory  Kisunko  33526
Kapil  KapoorPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2480  Productivity  Growth  and Resource  Mubarik  Ali  November  2000  D. Byerlee
Degradation  in Pakistan's  Punjab:  Derek  Byerlee  87287
A Decomposition  Analysis